Friday, September 23, 2016

A Look At How The Taliban Are Winning The War In Afghanistan

Sune Engel Rasmussen, Foreign Policy: First Helmand, Then Afghanistan

A trip through the country’s beleaguered south reveals demoralized soldiers, corrupt local officials, and sweeping Taliban gains in previously peaceful towns. How did Obama’s “good war” go so wrong?

LASHKAR GAH, Afghanistan — Abdul Hakim seems to have just vanished. The 15-year-old boy left his madrasa across the Pakistani border to visit relatives in Afghanistan. But since crossing into Helmand province on his way to meet his parents in Bolan, a suburb of bustling shops outside the provincial capital, nobody has heard from him.

The list of evils that could have befallen Abdul Hakim on his way home is long. In late July, the Taliban launched a series of attacks in Helmand and have since gobbled up territory across Afghanistan’s beleaguered southern province. Districts that for years were safe have now been seized by militants or are being ravaged in front-line fighting. Roaring airplanes, Afghan and American, drop bombs almost every night, causing casualties that are rarely publicized.

“There is no security. Our children are being killed,” says Habibullah, an elder from Abdul Hakim’s family.

Read more ....

WNU Editor: A sobering analysis on why the Afghan government and its allies are losing the war in Afghanistan.


Stephen Davenport said...

Taliban are not winning period. Its stalemate, the Taliban do not have the forces to take the country and the country does not have the strength to purge the Taliban. That does not meant the Taliban are winning.

Jay Farquharson said...

>>We fought a military war; our opponents fought a political one. We sought physical attrition; our opponents aimed for our psychological exhaustion. In the process we lost sight of one of the cardinal maxims of guerrilla war: the guerrilla wins if he does not lose. The conventional army loses if it does not win. The North Vietnamese used their armed forces the way a bull-fighter uses his cape — to keep us lunging in areas of marginal political importance.<<

Henry Kissenger, "The Vietnam Negotiations", Foreign Affairs, Vol. 48, No. 2 (January 1969), p. 214