What Has Kobane Battle Taught Us? -- Mark Urban, BBC
After a month of fighting, defenders of Kobane say Islamic State (IS) has been virtually driven out of the Syrian town. So what has been learned from this battle?
1. Kobane is not "strategically" important.
At least not in the classic sense of that word. It will not decide the fate of the Syrian civil war or indeed of the Pentagon-led campaign, designated Operation Inherent Resolve, against IS.
The primary importance of Kobane, a town populated by Kurds on the border with Turkey, lies in the scale of human misery that the battle and its displacement of 250,000 people has created.
This has had knock-on effects on the Kurdish relationship with Turkey, where most of those people have gone.
Read more ....
My Comment: Of all the points that have been outlined in this BBC report .... it is number 4 that is in play right now .... US: Hundreds of ISIL fighters dead in Kobane (Al Jazeera)
5 comments:
"Pentagon says air strikes killed several hundred ISIL fighters, but says Syrian town could still fall to rebel group." - aljazeera.com
Seven hundred less rapists.
I suspect that both ISIS and the coalition against ISIS have alternative reasons for making Kobani a major battle.
1. Kobani itself. I agree that the city is not strategic, in the sense that possession of it will control the outcome of the war in Syria and Iraq. Let's examine the value of Kobani from both sides' perspectives.
a. For ISIS, Kobani may have initially seemed like low hanging fruit, easy to conquer. Kobani's location on the border offers an escape route, and ISIS may have calculated that the Kurds would flee across the border, just as the Iraqi army has fled wherever there is an escape route. ISIS would expect the Kurds to fight to the end to defend Irbil, but not Kobani. ISIS also show a sophisticated appreciation of propaganda. Their conquest of Kobani would be televised for all the world to see, unlike Mosul.
b. For the coalition, I think that the resolve to defend Kobani grew as Kurdish resistance continued. It seems as though the U.S. decided to use air power aggressively around Kobani last week, 2-3 weeks after the battle started. Turkey also sees the value in defeating ISIS in Kobani, especially since the Kurds are doing the fighting. The Turks likely view this as a two-fer, hoping for maximum casualties on both sides.
c. In effect, Kobani has become a little like Stalingrad for both sides. There was no objective reason for either the Germans or the Soviets to fight to the death for Stalingrad, yet it became the turning point for the Eastern front during WWII. As Kurds resisted, I think ISIS likely calculated that, with a little extra effort, they could conquer Kobani. The coalition resistance increased, and an escalation resulted. I don't think ISIS originally intended an all out effort to conquer Kobani.
2. The larger war.
a. For the coalition, I agree that Kobani became a chance for the Americans to use their air power against concentrations of ISIS forces. That is one great insight of the article. The Syrian Observatory says that they can document about 350 ISIS deaths around Kobani, and estimates the real number is twice that, not including wounded. Those are serious casualties. Moreover, ISIS lost heavy weapons, which ISIS will find it hard to replace quickly. If ISIS really stops its attack now, the coalition will have defeated ISIS before the television cameras. That is a significant propaganda victory, and may suppress ISIS' recruitment for awhile. ISIS' televised defeat may also encourage resistance within their territory, and encourage others on the caliphate's borders to resist. Some of ISIS' advantage is the perception that they are invincible. Kobani proves that they are not.
b. For ISIS, the caliph seems militarily sophisticated. I suspect that ISIS have always seen Baghdad as the principal strategic prize, worth more than even Damascus. While Kobani has riveted the press' attention, ISIS quietly conquered most of Anbar Province, almost up to the exurbs of Baghdad. ISIS have done this without having to concentrate their forces in a way that presents targets for the coalition's air forces. While ISIS have lost significant casualties and equipment in Kobani, they have plenty of men for the Baghdad operations, plus Iraqi Sunni sympathisers who will join them, to fight the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Army has largely fled ISIS or surrendered, and ISIS likely calculates that the Iraqi Army will prove to be weak fighters, even to defend Baghdad.
c. For ISIS, Kobani can be seen as a diversion from the main event, i.e. the battle for Baghdad, or the Sunni parts of it. In this view, while Kobani got out of hand, ISIS' victory or defeat there does not affect the approaching battle for Baghdad.
d. For the coalition, the evident weakness of the Iraqis is likely clear to the West and perhaps the Iranians. I am not sure the Iraqis recognize their peril. They seem to believe their own press releases.
Publius,
Not much to add. Yes propaganda is the only value Kobani has I can think of for either side. The US for domestic reasons and ISIS for their war. I have a hard time believing much of anything that's stated about this battle.
This has occurred to me, ISIS has devoted assets and taken large casualties in this battle to take the Allies attention off of their moves for Baghdad.
I concur with the analysis from Publius that Baghdad (at least the Sunni part of the city) is the ultimate prize .... and where the big battle and fight will be.
Question is do Shia militias fight better than the Iraqi army. I believe they do.
At least the Iranian trained ones will.
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