Where Did Al-Qaeda In Iraq Go Wrong?

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A U.S Army soldier pulls security near a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter during an air assault mission on the banks of the Tigris River, Bayji, Iraq, Oct. 14, 2008. The soldiers are assigned to the 101st Airborne Division's 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Richard Rzepka

From The Washington Post:

Even before the U.S. military announced last week that it had killed the alleged No. 2 leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq, the group had been widely seen as on the ropes. Where did al-Qaeda in Iraq go wrong? In a paper prepared for the recent annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, the Australian political scienist Andrew Phillips argues persuasively that, by their nature, al-Qaeda affiliates tend to alienate their hosts. So in the "long war" against jihadism, time may ultimately be on our side -- if we show patience, tolerance and a willingness to listen to local grievances.

When considered within the context of the broader history of the global jihadist movement, Al Qaeda's defeat in Iraq appears far from exceptional. . . . In successive conflicts ranging from Bosnia to Chechnya to Kashmir, the jihad jet-set has rapidly worn out its welcome among local host populations as a result of its idelogical inflexibility and high-handedness, as well as its readiness to resort to indiscriminate violence against locals at the first signs of challenge. Throughout their history, Al Qaeda's operatives have consistently sought to graft the global jihadist agenda onto localized conflicts involving Muslims. However, with the notable exceptions of Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban and to a certain extent the lawless tribal belt straddling the contemporary Afghanistan-Pakistan border, they have been generally unsuccessful in converting locals to the jihadist cause, much less securing a territorial base for the Caliphate. That this pattern has so frequently been repeated suggests that the underlying causes of Al Qaeda's defeat in Iraq may transcend the specific circumstances of that conflict . . . . Baldly stated, the causes of Al Qaeda's defeat in Iraq can be located in its ideological DNA.

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My Comment: Families always want the best for their children. A future and hope that they can grasp, easily understand, and feel that with time these goals can be achieved. Al Qaeda does not offer anything that resembles a future, hope, and goals that can be easily grasped.