WNU Editor: Two excellent articles from CQ Politics. My comment after reading them ..... Could have. Would have. Should have.

CIA Agent Says Pentagon Botched Chance to Wipe Out al Qaeda in Iraq -- CQ Politics

Charles "Sam" Faddis, who led a CIA team into northern Iraq following the 9/11 attacks, says the Pentagon's "endless planning and delays" foiled a chance to wipe out a band of al Qaeda leaders who were fleeing American bombs in Afghanistan.

Faddis says the delays, beginning in 2002, also facilitated the escape of some "key" al Qaeda figures, including terrorist scientists who were working on chemical and biological weapons.

"Some died, some are still on the run," Faddis said in a telephone interview Tuesday, following his appearance on NPR's Diane Rehm Show to promote a new book, Operation Hotel California: The Clandestine War Inside Iraq.

"The site was physically destroyed ... but certainly the research wasn't destroyed."

Coming on the heels of similar revelations by a former Delta Force operative about scuttled missions to kill Osama Bin Laden, broadcast on 60 Minutes on Sunday, Faddis' accusations add form to a hardening portrait of the Pentagon's post-9/11 leadership as inept and overly cautious.





Read more ....

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Rumsfeld Spokesman, CIA Agent Skirmish Over 'Botch' Allegation
-- CQ Politics

Lawrence Di Rita, former spokesman for Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, escalated his attack today on a CIA officer's charge that Pentagon dithering wasted a chance to wipe out top al Qaeda figures in northern Iraq back in 2002.

In my original story, published late last night, I quoted Di Rita's objection to the allegation by Charles "Sam" Faddis, who led a CIA team into northern Iraq following the 9/11 attacks, that the Pentagon's "endless planning and delays" foiled a chance to wipe out a band of al Qaeda leaders who were fleeing American bombs in Afghanistan.

After reading that piece online, Di Rita had this further comment:

Faddis's recollections reflect an utter lack of awareness of what U.S. policy was at the time. In 2002, the president had not yet gone to the Congress, to the international community, etc. to present the case for military operations. At that period, a diplomatic approach was still being followed.