Saturday, March 7, 2009

WNU Editor: The Afghanistan And Pakistan Conflict Will Now Be Treated As The Same War


WNU Editor: A number of bloggers have been lumping the Afghanistan and Pakistan conflicts together as one big war. I have resisted this idea .... trying to separate the two.

I cannot do that anymore.

Both conflicts have the same players on both sides, and if there is ever a solution and resolution to this conflict, both countries must be involved.

The Small Wars Journal lumps both wars as the same, and Michael Yon has been calling this conflict the AfPak War .... they are both right.

From here on after .... I will adopt Michael Yon's term for this war.

2 comments:

T. Greer said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
T. Greer said...

I call foul play. Lt. Gen. Barno refuted this view rather nicely in his most recent testimony to congress:

Pakistan

Although describing a strategic approach to Pakistan is beyond the scope of this piece, ignoring the linkage between Afghanistan and Pakistan would be irresponsible.

Pakistan arguably presents the Unites States with its greatest strategic challenge in the region.

The second largest Islamic country in the world armed with several dozen nuclear weapons demands our attention.

That said, the conflict in Afghanistan is not simply a subset of a broader set of challenges in Pakistan. “Solving” Pakistan would not in and of itself “solve” Afghanistan. Afghan problems are as much internally driven (crime, corruption, narcotics; lack of governance, infrastructure, economics) as they are any result of the insurgents who operate from sanctuary in Pakistani border areas. Solving these internal problems requires creating the right conditions of security, but equally important requires adopting an effective development, economic and governance approach within Afghanistan itself.

Pakistan requires its own strategy and its own solutions as the U.S. assesses its requirements in the region. The U.S. must assist Pakistan in managing change –economically, militarily, perhaps even societally – as it deals with immense problems brought about by a deadly combination of both internal and external factors. The U.S. must partner with the Pakistani government to develop a vision of a long-term strategic partnership between Pakistan and United States – not one simply based upon today’s transactional relationship anchored in fighting terrorists in the tribal areas. Much like the U.S. has evolved the idea of a long-term strategic partnership with India, commensurate effort must be invested into a parallel track with Pakistan – but not as a zero sum game.

As to Pakistan’s relationship to the conflict in Afghanistan, U.S. success in reversing the decline in Afghanistan and achieving success would increase our leverage with Pakistan. Arguably, much of the schizophrenic Pakistani approach to the Afghan conflict today is based upon their expectation that the U.S. and our allies lack staying power -- and will move rapidly for the exits if failure is imminent.

Success in Afghanistan might reverse that perception and lend much greater credibility to U.S. statements of long-term commitment.


SOURCE: http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/February/Barno%2002-26-09.pdf

(An interesting read in and of itself. The 2025 timeline for Afghanistan certainly was something that caught my attention.)