US Navy SEAL instructor observes Malian soldiers in live fire exercise near Gao, February 2010 (Photo: Max Blumenfeld, JSOTF-TS/AFRICOM)
U.S. Special Operations Forces Screwed Up In Mali -- Peter Dörrie, War is Boring
Why years of military cooperation achieved so little
The total collapse of the Malian army in the face of a Tuareg rebellion in 2011—and a subsequent coup by junior officers against the democratically-elected government—proves an important point.
That U.S. military cooperation with Mali up to 2011—specifically, efforts by U.S. Army Special Forces to train Malian troops—was an overall failure.
What’s been missing until now is a thorough analysis of exactly what went wrong. Army Maj. Simon Powelson’ new master’s thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School is the most insightful account of U.S.-Malian military cooperation prior to the crisis, which escalated into the capture of half the country by militant groups affiliated with Al Qaeda.
Read more ....
Update: How US military assistance failed in Mali -- Bruce Whitehouse, Bridges from Bamako
My Comment: Bruce Whitehouse's above post is a must read .... he was on the ground in Mali and was witness to the events that led to the disaster that unfolded in Mali last year. Both articles are sober reading .... and they both reveal a disturbing but not surprising truth .... U.S. Special Ops do make mistakes.
1 comment:
At least from the articles I gather this is more of a problem of doctrine and misunderstanding by upper echelon of local realities. The Romans faced the same problem in that you could train a blue dyed Celt and enroll him into the Legion and he was a Legionnaire, but you couldn't train them in mass and turn them into a separate Legion.
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