Source: Wikimedia
Paul Blake, BBC: Ramadi assault: How a small change in tactics helped Iraqi forces
A switch in tactics has provided the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) with some victories in their battle against the so-called Islamic State (IS), notably in Ramadi, says the US military.
The change came in the late summer.
Lieutenant General Sean MacFarland took over the US-led coalition against IS known as Operation Inherent Resolve in September.
Upon assuming his new post, the general began studying what worked and what had not worked in the fight against IS up to that point.
Recognising that IS was a different enemy from the one faced during the last decade, he ordered an adjustment to the training and equipment that was being provided to the Iraqis.
WNU Editor: I do not know if it is a small change in tactics that has changed the momentum in the war against the Islamic State .... for me it is having an army outnumbering the enemy by more than 50:1 (as is the case in the battle for Ramadi), and being backed by massive U.S. and coalition air-power.
Update: In Ramadi battle, a potential model for rolling back ISIS (Howard Lafranchi, CSM)
4 comments:
Soldiers and armies do not know how switch between different modes of fighting?
I guess engineers, who had designed MRAPs for years, would have no clue on how to design tanks for armored combat. It might take them decades to learn to reduce the profile of the tank. Centuries even!
Of curse the US will take credit for any success, and abjure any failure.
Aizino,
"Soldiers and armies do not know how switch between different modes of fighting?" You've got a good point (one that's been argued in the military community for centuries), but it is an endevour with habits that are really hard to change.
The Iraqi "Army" was only supposed to be a 40,000 member strong "Border Patrol Force", ie. Customs Officers.
Iraq was supposed to be "defended" by a 150,000 strong U.S. force permanently stationed in the country on "Enduring Bases" with propositioned Weapons to support the deployment of 200,000 more if needed.
As the Insurgency grew, the Iraqi Army was increased to 100,000, but their role was not to quell the insurgency or take back areas, instead their role was to "occupy and patrol" areas retaken by U.S. Forces, and to act as human shields for the U.S. Bases.
They were never "supposed" to be an actual National Army, and so were never armed, trained or equipted to fill that role.
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