Rewriting Past Intelligence Mistakes

Iranian technicians look on as an International Atomic Energy Agency inspector, foreground, checks a uranium facility in 2005. AFP/Getty Images

U.S. Considers a New Assessment of Iran Threat -- Wall Street Journal

Amid Pressure After Latest Nuclear Revelations, Spy Agencies Rethink a 2007 Judgment That Weapons Effort Had Been Halted.

WASHINGTON -- U.S. spy agencies are considering whether to rewrite a controversial 2007 intelligence report that asserted Tehran halted its efforts to build nuclear weapons in 2003, current and former U.S. intelligence officials say.

The intelligence agencies' rethink comes as pressure is mounting on Capitol Hill, and among U.S. allies, for the Obama administration to redo the 2007 assessment, after a string of recent revelations about Tehran's nuclear program.

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My Comment: The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate and conclusions were always in dispute, the only difference is that there is more information (now) on making a more accurate assessment.

With the discovery of a secret nuclear enrichment plant outside of Qom, this debate on Iran's intent has now become moot. Iran has a nuclear program whose intent is to produce enriched uranium. The only question that people should be asking now is .... are there more "secret" nuclear sites, and what is Iran's timetable.

The Politicization Of Intelligence -- A Commentary

(Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell chats with National Intelligence Council Chairman Thomas Fingar: Photo is from The Washington Note)

Intelligence Misestimates -- Washington Times

Tom Fingar's is not, of course, exactly a household name. Nor is the building he will depart a publicly recognized fixture in Washington's official real estate. Still, when the history of the Iranian nuclear threat - and all that flows from it - is written, his dismal tenure as deputy director for analysis in the Office of National Intelligence will figure prominently.

After all, at a critical moment in the Bush administration, as evidence mounted in late 2007 of the true and ominous nuclear weapons ambitions of an Iranian regime that professed an interest only in peaceful nuclear energy, Mr. Fingar was instrumental in producing one of history's most politicized and misleading National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs). The lead sentence of the summary of this document made the stunning statement that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003.

The effect of such a declaration was as palpable as it was predictable. Critics of the Bush administration seized on the finding to demand an end to any forcible effort to prevent the mullahocracy in Tehran from continuing to use its "peaceful" nuclear program as a cover for obtaining the bomb. Allies who knew better and had been pressed to join Washington in preventing such an outcome were appalled and alienated. Our enemies in Iran around elsewhere around the world were emboldened.

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Update: Contrary Commentary is from the Washington Note: National Intelligence Council Chairman Thomas Fingar on What Goes Into a National Intelligence Estimate.

My Comment: I am not privy to intelligence reports. I do not have any direct contacts with people in the intelligence community. What I rely on is the past history of these organizations, how accurate they have been in their assessments, and if possible, determine the political agenda of the main authors.

In this particular case, the NIE does not have an exemplary record. But they are trying .... and for that I will give them a little credit.