A Change In U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy?

U.S. Army 1st. Lt. Harold Castweda, center, talks with an Afghan village elder about any improvements that can be made to a mosque in the village of Dubazai at Logar province, Afghanistan, May 9, 2010. Castweda is assigned to 173rd Brigade Support Battalion, which conducted a security check of the village. U.S. Army photo by Spc. De'Yonte Mosley

Pentagon Rethinking Value Of Major Counterinsurgencies -- McClatchy News

WASHINGTON — Nearly a decade after the United States began to focus its military training and equipment purchases almost exclusively on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. military strategists are quietly shifting gears, saying that large-scale counterinsurgency efforts cost too much and last too long.

The domestic economic crisis and the Obama administration's commitment to withdraw from Iraq and begin drawing down in Afghanistan next year are factors in the change. The biggest spur, however, is a growing recognition that large-scale counterinsurgency battles have high casualty rates for troops and civilians, eat up equipment that must be replaced and rarely end in clear victory or defeat.

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My Comment: After fighting in Afghanistan for almost 9 years .... and in Iraq for 7 years .... there is now a realization that the strategy is not working and the costs to continue are too high.

My prediction, the "new strategy" to be soon formulated and implemented will result in almost all U.S. forces out of Afghanistan within 2-3 years, and U.S. forces stationed in Iraq will remain in the desert where no one can see them (and be able to shoot and/or bomb them).