Why Russia's Counter Terrorism Strategy Is Working In Syria

© Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

Daniel Byman, War On the Rocks: Death Solves All Problems: The Authoritarian Counterinsurgency Toolkit

Bashar al-Assad should be losing. His regime has slaughtered civilians, turned Syria’s people against one another, politicized the country’s military, maintained a discriminatory political system, and won neither hearts nor minds. Yet he has defied skeptics and still hangs on to power. Nor is Assad the lonely dictator killing his way to victory. Algeria, China, and Egypt are confronting insurgencies and are largely trying to repress their way to success — as they have done in the past. Russia alone has confronted over 20 insurgencies in the last century and has suppressed the vast majority of them successfully. As scholar Yuri Zhukov contends, Russia’s long history suggests “repression works, but not in moderation.” Scholars and policymakers, however, often wrongly assume authoritarian states will fail to defeat insurgents unless they reform and neglect the distinct ways they wage counterinsurgency.

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Previous Post: Russia Is Winning The War In Syria (February 3, 2016)

WNU Editor: The Soviet Union lost in Afghanistan, but Russia does have a long history in successfully battling Islamic insurgencies .... with some of them lasting for years if not decades. Stalin had a particularly brutal method in handling such insurgencies .... mass deportations, starvation, mass killings .... it took a few years but these insurgencies were defeated (Operation Lentil). As to the current Syrian conflict and Russia's involvement .... it is different. As bad as the Assad regime is (and it is bad) .... they are facing groups and organizations that have alienated millions of non-Sunni and secular Syrians who have no interest in supporting the rebel cause. And while this war is going to grind on for a long time, I would not be surprised if the Syrian regime will eventually win .... a victory steeped in blood and massive destruction .... but a victory nevertheless. Unfortunately .... like Sherman's march in the South during the American civil war was the final straw that broke the rebellion .... Syria is going through the same thing right now .... and one cannot help but feel for the innocent who must live and endure all of this until it is finally over.

Update: Yup .... Syrian rebels are losing Aleppo and perhaps also the war (Liz Sly and Zakaria Zakaria, Washington Post).

Update #2: There is some truth to this .... Assad has a clear plan to stay in power. This is it (Faisal Al Yafai, The National)

A Latin American Perspective On Today's Counter-Insurgency Doctrine

Pictures of the missing in Argentina's Dirty War

Counter-Insurgency: From Latin America To Afghanistan -- Middle East Online

The US COIN program has its origins in the decades long US interventions - secretive and not so - in its own southern hemisphere. And the war in Afghanistan (and in Iraq) takes on the same state terror versus insurgent terror attributes of that long era of violence, notes Pablo Behrens.

In recent decades there have been only one or two precedents in which the United States and the United Kingdom could analyze directly the use of guerilla warfare by insurgents, and the response by government authorities. In the US' case it was the urban guerilla movement and the ‘threat’ of progressive political parties in South and Central America and the State terror it unleashed during the 1970s. In the case of the UK, it was the IRA mainland attacks of the 1980s.

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My Comment: Are the lessons learned from the 1970s-80s Latin American insurgency wars being applied to Iraq and Afghanistan? .... Pablo Behrens in his post clearly believes that they are .... and for all the wrong reasons.

A Change In U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy?

U.S. Army 1st. Lt. Harold Castweda, center, talks with an Afghan village elder about any improvements that can be made to a mosque in the village of Dubazai at Logar province, Afghanistan, May 9, 2010. Castweda is assigned to 173rd Brigade Support Battalion, which conducted a security check of the village. U.S. Army photo by Spc. De'Yonte Mosley

Pentagon Rethinking Value Of Major Counterinsurgencies -- McClatchy News

WASHINGTON — Nearly a decade after the United States began to focus its military training and equipment purchases almost exclusively on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. military strategists are quietly shifting gears, saying that large-scale counterinsurgency efforts cost too much and last too long.

The domestic economic crisis and the Obama administration's commitment to withdraw from Iraq and begin drawing down in Afghanistan next year are factors in the change. The biggest spur, however, is a growing recognition that large-scale counterinsurgency battles have high casualty rates for troops and civilians, eat up equipment that must be replaced and rarely end in clear victory or defeat.

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My Comment: After fighting in Afghanistan for almost 9 years .... and in Iraq for 7 years .... there is now a realization that the strategy is not working and the costs to continue are too high.

My prediction, the "new strategy" to be soon formulated and implemented will result in almost all U.S. forces out of Afghanistan within 2-3 years, and U.S. forces stationed in Iraq will remain in the desert where no one can see them (and be able to shoot and/or bomb them).

Plan To Support Counterinsurgency In Pakistan Reveals Rift

Pakistani Army Chief Ashfaq Kayani (right) meets with U.S. General David Petraeus in Islamabad in January. (Photo from Radio Free Europe)

From The Washington Independent:

Dispute Highlights Gap Between Broad Goals and Immediate Challenges

A program that the Obama administration calls crucial to Pakistan’s fight against the Taliban is being criticized at the State Department and on Capitol Hill for overly militarizing the problem.

The dispute represents an early rift with some progressive members of Congress over discrepancies between the administration’s broad foreign policy goals and its approach to immediate challenges. One of the central aspects of the administration’s approach to the crisis in Pakistan is a new creation called the Pakistani Counterinsurgency Capabilities Fund, a $400 million annual program to give the Pakistani military equipment and training for counterinsurgency missions that it had shown little competency in waging. During April testimony, Michele Flournoy, the undersecretary of defense for policy, called it “absolutely critical to the success” of the Obama administration’s strategy in Pakistan. Both the House and the Senate showed themselves receptive to the proposal, adding the so-called PCCF to the war supplemental that passed the House on May 14 and the Senate on May 21.

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My Comment: I always gave credit to President Bush on his attempts and efforts to make sure that the conduct of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan stayed out of the hands of the politicians. There were many incidents (of course) in which politics intervened .... but overall I will have to say that much of this intervention was minimized on the prosecution and conduct of the war when the actual fighting had to be done.

This is not the case now. Generals and commanders in the field are now being constantly over ruled by people back home. The result of this armchair quarter backing is highlighted by the complete lack of support for assisting the counter insurgency campaign in Pakistan.

The above article accurately reports this rift.

Pakistan's Flawed Counterinsurgency And Colombia's Lessons

The Day.com:

News from Pakistan paints a frightening picture. Elements of the Pakistan Taliban have seized territory within the country's borders and Pakistani troops have launched a desperate offensive to recover territory. Meanwhile, more than a million refugees flee to escape the battle. This assault will fail to end the insurgency, however, because it ignores requirements for success.

If the government hopes to permanently end the Taliban insurgency, the military offensive must be complemented by strategies to provide security for the population and restore government presence throughout the affected territories.

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My Comment: A must read piece to understand what needs to be done in Pakistan .... and in a way .... what needs to be done in Afghanistan. (Hat Tip to Prairie Pundit).

The Rise Of Kilcullen And The COINdinistas

David Kilcullen

From Foreign Policy Blog:

An Air Force pilot explains why he found the rise of counterinsurgency specialists in the U.S. military over the last couple of years personally and professionally reassuring:

My love affair with the COIN community began when the dissidents took over the Iraq war, and I realized they actually knew what they were doing. After years of growing disillusionment with some of my leaders, I finally found a community of competent, intelligent military professionals I could trust. I can't overstate how important that was to me personally. Over the past year I've been drawn deeper and deeper into the COIN community. I follow its blogs, read its recommended books, and study the debates among of its members. The contributions of this community are extraordinary and I am constantly learning from it.

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For more info: A Conversation With David Kilcullen -- Washington Post

My Comment: I am personally more focused on how new technology developments being introduced to the war theater can impact

Winning Counterinsurgency Warfare -- A Video

The speaker is retired Brigadier Justin Kelly of the Australian Army.

Hat Tip: Richard Fernandez at The Belmont Club

The Linits Of Counter Terrorism

Rich Clabaugh/Staff Christian Science Monitor

In Basilan, Philippines, A US Counterterrorism Model
Frays -- Christian Science Monitor

Renewed violence on the island shows the challenge of wiping out militant groups for good.

Manila - Just a couple of years ago, the Philippines was hailed as a success story in the US-led war on terror.

A military campaign by US-backed Philippines Special Forces had routed al Qaeda-linked Abu Sayyaf terrorists from their stronghold in the southern island of Basilan, killed their leaders, and confined surviving diehards to a remote island. Generous economic aid and "hearts and minds" outreach undergirded the "Philippines model."

"The iron fist and the hand of friendship succeeded in ... restoring both peace and hope to the island," crowed an August 2006 State Department report.

But recent violence shows how hard it is to keep the peace, and to uproot terrorists for good. Fighting broke out in Basilan early last week between the Philippines military and Abu Sayyaf. Battles Sunday left five soldiers dead and 24 injured, and reports say some 3,000 civilians have fled their villages amid the violence. The Abu Sayyaf is eyed for a recent spate of kidnappings, the latest of a girl and a nursing student.

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My Comment: A sobering assessment on what it takes to defeat an insurgency. It is also clear that the Philippines do not have the resources to complete the job.

How To Win A Counter Insurgency Campaign

MILITARY: General Says Victory

'All But Won' In Anbar

Camp Pendleton's Maj. Gen. John Kelly said Friday that the military is on the verge on victory in Iraq's once rebellious Anbar province.

"We have all but won this thing when they once said that was impossible," Kelly said during a telephone interview with the North County Times from his headquarters in the city of Fallujah, once a flash point in the battle against the insurgency. "The rest of the country is now following Anbar's lead."

The two-star general was deliberately cautious about declaring outright victory, stressing that work remains to solidify security in the region, which intelligence officials said could never be tamed.

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My Comment: The belief among many is that a counter insurgency campaign can never succeed. Anbar proves them wrong.

Counter-Insurgency, Chad-Style

From the Danger Room:

"An alleged [up]rising led by an Islamic preacher in the oil-rich southern region of Chad was repressed with great loss of life by government forces in the first days of July," Andrew McGregor reported in Terrorism Focus last week. "The incident in the town of Kouno came in response to calls for an international jihad from Ahmat Ismail Bichara, a fiery 28-year-old religious leader, and the destruction of most of the town by his followers."

Funny -- I was in southern Chad at the time, and I didn't hear a peep about this until after the fact. N'Djamena's violent quashing of an embryonic terror and insurgent group, in a total media blackout, demonstrates an ugly brute-force alternative to the West's counter-insurgency strategy, which aims to understand the "human terrain," win hearts and minds, and enlist the support of local tribes before rolling in with tanks and artillery.

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My Comment: This is the rule to counter-insurgency, not the exception.