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Michael Kofman, War On The Rocks: The Seven Deadly Sins Of Russia Analysis
As the clock counts down to the end of another tumultuous and difficult year of dealing with Russia, the natural instinct is to look back on the battles and surprises of 2015 with an eye to making predictions for the coming year. There is material aplenty: the battle of Debaltseve, Moscow’s operations in Syria, a crisis with Turkey that still burns bright. A new year offers new opportunities for prognostication: Where will Russia strike next? What is Putin thinking? What are the likely flashpoints of 2016? Instead of this traditional exercise, Russia experts should reflect on a year of discussions, briefings, round tables, merciless PowerPoint decks about hybrid war, and occasional spats in the virtual pages of outlets like War on the Rocks. What are the nagging questions, questionable assumptions, and unknowns that beset the analytical and policymaking community?
Experts and policymakers who deal with Russia are living in a high-tempo environment, keeping pace with military interventions, crises, and the frequent twists in bilateral relations. However, in any such endeavor, it is possible to learn lessons that are not true. This is my own attempt at presenting a list of questionable bits of analysis and assumptions that exist within the community. In doing so, I hope to push people to critically examine how they look at Russia. Why do we say some of these things, and more importantly why do we think them?
WNU Editor: As one who is always reading Western analysis on Russia .... this post was a joy to read ... because it is so true.
1 comment:
WNU Editor,
Yes, and no.
He forgot the "need" to stick to "the narrative", or as Col. Pat Lang notes, the " Borg-ist" propaganda.
A " perfect" example of this is the Kalibir missile use, which was told to be a "wasteful" demonstration of Russian precision munitions as a "product demonstration" and as a means of boosting sales,
( at the same time, every Russian iron bomb was an example of Russian backwardness and lack of concern, for Civillian casualties),
It was definately "not" a message to NATO and Turkey of Russian capabilities, ( a back off statement),
Until of course, the ONI quietly releases their report,
And France's use of million dollar SCALP EG's is sold as a fear of Russia's No Fly Zone, even though they are flying from the Gulf and engaging targets ($20k Toyota Trucks) not even close to the S-400 air defence grid.
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